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Federal Taxation
By Robert G. Woodward*
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided over sixty cases during
1980 that involved federal tax issues. This survey article discusses the
Fifth Circuit's federal tax decisions that were deemed the most significant
to tax scholars and practitioners. These decisions are grouped according
to their subject matter.
I.

INCOME, DEDUCTIONS, AND CREDITS

In two separate cases the Fifth Circuit rejected attempts by cash basis
taxpayers to defer the income from the sale of one year's cotton into the
next year. In the first of these cases, Warren v. United States,' the cotton
gins which ginned and baled the taxpayers' cotton also made arrangements for the sale of the cotton. Under the arrangement with the cotton
gins, the taxpayers had the option either to obtain the sales proceeds immediately or to defer their receipt until the following year. The court held
that, since the gins received the sales proceeds as agents for the taxpayers, the taxpayers were properly taxable on the sales proceeds when they
were received by the gins.
Watson v. Commissioner' was the second case in which a cotton farmer
was unsuccessful in deferring the income from a crop sale to the following
year. The taxpayers in Watson had sold cotton to a gin in November of
1973 under a deferred payment arrangement in which the taxpayers received an irrevocable bank letter of credit requiring the bank to pay the
taxpayers in January, 1974. Although the taxpayers could not technically
assign the credit, Texas law provided that they could assign their right to
its proceeds. Affirming the Tax Court's decision in favor of the Commissioner, the court found that the letter of credit was property with an ascertainable fair market value which constituted an "amount realized" in
*
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University (J.D., 1975). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 613 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).
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1973 within the meaning of section 1001(a)." The court therefore held
that the sales proceeds
were properly taxable to the taxpayers in 1973
4
rather than in 1974.

In Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States,5 the court held that the
taxpayer failed to qualify for installment reporting of gain realized on the
sale of two mineral leases because the amount of a mortgage assumed by
the purchaser was treated as payment in the year of sale to the extent it
exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the leases. This caused the payments in
the year of sale to exceed 30% of the total selling price, with the result
that the taxpayer did not qualify for installment reporting under section
453.' The original sale documents had clearly provided that the purchaser
would assume the taxpayer's mortgage indebtedness, but an amendment
to the original agreement that was made four days after the original closing stated that in lieu of a formal assumption, the purchaser would give
the taxpayer its own promissory note in like amount. After admitting in
its original claim for refund that the purchaser had assumed the mortgage
as partial payment for the leases, the taxpayer belatedly attempted to
argue that there was in fact no assumption. (The taxpayer apparently attempted to have the arrangement characterized as a "wraparound" mortgage transaction in which no assumption took place.7 ) The court, how3. Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to "sections" refer to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
4. The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 amended I.R.C. § 453 to provide that a
third-party guarantee (including a standby letter of credit) used to secure the deferred payment obligation of the purchaser is not treated as payment of the obligation. See I.R.C. §
453(0(3) (1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 2(a) (Oct. 19, 1980). This amendment
would not apply, however, in cases such as Watson in which the letter of credit is used as
the primary means of payment rather than as a security arrangement. S. REP. No. 96-1000,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8340, 8357.
The 1980 Act also amended § 453 to permit the use of the installment reporting method to
report gain from deferred payment sales in which the purchase price is paid in a single lump
sum amount in a year subsequent to the year of sale. See I.R.C. § 453(b)(1)(1980), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 2(a) (Oct. 19, 1980) (defining "installment sale" so as to
eliminate the two-payment rule of prior law). Thus, the deferral result sought by the taxpayers in Watson may now be achieved if the bank letter of credit is used as security for the
purchaser's deferred payment obligation rather than as the primary means of payment.
5. 613 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1980).
6. See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c)(1979). The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 repealed the 30% limitation on payments in the year of sale for taxable years ending after
October 19, 1980. See I.R.C. § 453(b)(1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 2(a) (Oct.
19, 1980). Nevertheless, liabilities that are assumed by the purchaser or to which the purchased property is subject will continue to be treated under the regulations as payment
received by the seller in the year of sale and will therefore increase the portion of the seller's
gain that is reported in that year. See Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(3)(1981).
7. The temporary regulations- promulgated under the Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980 take the position that a "wraparound" mortgage arrangement cannot be used to avoid
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ever, held that the taxpayer was bound by the form in which the
transaction was originally cast.
Ireland v. United States$ concerned the taxability to a shareholderofficer of the use of his corporation's aircraft for trips between his Florida
home and the corporation's headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama. To
remedy an antagonistic relationship between the corporation's president
and the taxpayer, who was the corporation's chairman of the board, the
taxpayer had moved to Florida from Birmingham after an industrial psychologist suggested that he physically remove himself from the corporation's main office. Nevertheless, the court held that the value of the
flights was taxable income to the taxpayer, applying the well established
rule that commuting expenses are personal rather than business expenses.9 The unusual circumstances of the case did not require a different
result because, as the court pointed out, the taxpayer's decision to move
to Florida rather than simply to remove his office from the corporation's
Birmingham headquarters was primarily a personal one.'The court did
reverse the district court, however, on the issue of the valuation of the
flights, holding that the Internal Revenue Service could not compute the
taxpayer's additional income based upon the corporation's cost per mile
(including depreciation) for operating its fleet of aircraft. Rather, the
court held that the cost of commercial charter flights would be a more
reasonable basis for determining the amount of the taxpayer's additional
income.
Suburban Realty Co. v. United States1 0 is essential reading for anyone
who is seeking guidance on the question of whether a taxpayer's sale of
real estate will give rise to capital gain or ordinary income. The court in
that case considered whether the taxpayer, whose primary activity had
been the sale of relatively small parcels of realty from a large tract for
commercial and residential development, was entitled to capital gain
treatment on the sales of certain parcels with respect to which it had not
undertaken any development or subdivision activity. The court treated its
1976 en banc decision in Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States" as the
starting point for its analysis. The court observed, however, that the jurisprudence of the real estate capital gain-ordinary income issue has often
the treatment of liabilities in excess of basis as immediate payment. See Tress. Reg. §
15A.453-1(b)(3)(ii)(1981). But see Estate of Lamberth v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 302 (1958);
Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659 (1955).
8. 621 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1980).
9. The court did not consider whether the additional income qualified as "personal service income" qualifying for the 50% maximum tax rate under I.R.C. § 1348, apparently
because the case concerned a taxable year in which that provision was not effective.
10. 615 F.2d 171 (1980).
11. 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
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focused on various factual "tests" or "factors" rather than the controlling
statute, and that these tests "have seemingly acquired an independent
meaning of their own, only loosely tied to their statutory pier.'"' Thus,
the court in Suburban Realty focused upon the language of section
1221(1) itself, which denies capital asset status to "property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business." The court noted that this language requires that independent determinations be made concerning: (1) the nature of the taxpayer's business or businesses; (2) the taxpayer's purpose in holding the
property in question (i.e., whether the eventual sale in connection with a
business of the taxpayer was its primary purpose in holding the property); and (3) whether the sales contemplated by the taxpayer were "ordinary" in the course of its business. The court then focused on the key
factor emphasized in Biedenharn-the substantiality and frequency of
the taxpayer's sales-and noted that the evidence relating to this factor is
most importhnt because it is highly relevant to all three of the principal
1

statutory inquiries.

3

Next, the court considered the facts of the case against the analytical
framework it had laid out. Because of the taxpayer's frequent and substantial real estate sales activities, the court easily found that the taxpayer was in the business of selling real estate. In so holding, the court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that it was not engaged in any business
at all. The court found that the taxpayer's actual sales rendered irrelevant the insignificant level of the taxpayer's subdivision and development
activities and the total absence of any advertising or sales solicitation activities. The court, in addressing the taxpayer's primary purpose in holding the property in question, assumed that the taxpayer had originally
acquired the property for investment. Nevertheless, it concluded that the
taxpayer's subsequent sales activities evidenced a change of its primary
holding purpose from investment to sale. The court then dealt with the
taxpayer's argument that its holding purpose had changed back to investment when its directors began discussing liquidation of the corporation's
property and withdrawing subdivision plats previously filed with respect
to certain portions of the property. Although the court saw the factual
determination on this question to be the closest one in the case, it found
that the taxpayer's continuing sales activity during the period in question
negated the claim for a change in the purpose for holding the property.
The court had no difficulty in resolving the third statutory test, since the
sales contemplated by the taxpayer were clearly "ordinary" in the course
of its real estate sales business.
12. 615 F.2d at 177.
13. Id. at 178.
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The court in Suburban Realty concluded its opinion with a discussion
of whether it should ignore the conclusion it had reached by applying the
plain language of section 1221(1) in view of the fact that the profits realized by the taxpayer arose from demographic and market forces rather
than the taxpayer's own efforts. After reviewing the controlling decisions
by the Supreme Court in this area, it concluded that the plain language
of the statute must be given effect. Placing particular emphasis upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,"' the court concluded that, if the other requirements of section
1221(1) are met, profits from appreciation in value caused by market
forces are to be treated as ordinary income when the ordinary business of
the taxpayer is to take advantage of such profits.
Another case concerning the real estate "dealer" issue was Reese v.
Commissioner,5 in which the court considered whether an individual taxpayer was entitled to deduct his loss on the sale of certain property as an
ordinary loss rather than as a capital loss. In that case the taxpayer, who
was chief executive and a principal shareholder of a corporation, had arranged for the construction of a new plant for the corporation on land
that he owned. The taxpayer planned to construct the building and then
sell the property upon completion of the construction to a group of investors who would lease it back to the corporation. Before construction was
completed, however, the corporation defaulted on an unrelated debt that
had been guaranteed by the taxpayer, and the corporation's creditor successfully sued the taxpayer on his guaranty and forced a sheriff's sale of
the land and partially completed plant for $25,000.
The taxpayer sought to deduct $137,000 of his total $162,000 investment in the property as an ordinary loss, conceding that the $25,000
applied from the sheriff's sale to reduce his obligation as a guarantor was
deductible only as a nonbusiness bad debt under section 166.6 The taxpayer's primary argument was that the property was denied capital asset
status under section 1221(1) because he held it primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. The court rejected
this argument, finding that the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or
business with respect to the property. The court regarded the project as
an isolated, nonrecurring venture, stating the rule that a single sales
transaction ordinarily will not constitute a trade or business if the taxpayer had no expectation of continuing in the particular field of
1
endeavor. 7
14.
15.
16.
17.

350 U.S. 46 (1955).
615 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 230 n.4.
Id. at 230-31.
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In Battelstein v. Internal Revenue Service,'" the court was sharply divided on the question of whether the taxpayers were entitled to interest
deductions under section 163(a) for interest payments made with funds
advanced from the original lender. A savings association had agreed to
lend the taxpayers the purchase price of certain property, and also agreed
to make future advances to the taxpayers to cover the interest costs of
the original loan and other carrying and development costs as they became due. Each quarter, the savings association would notify the taxpayers of the interest currently due on the original loan. The taxpayers would
then send the savings association a check in this amount and, upon receipt of this check, the savings association would send the taxpayers its
own check for an additional loan in the identical amount.
The initial panel that heard the case, in a majority opinion by Judge
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., held that the taxpayers were not entitled under
the cash method of accounting to deduct interest on the loans because the
interest was not "paid" in the taxable years in question. The court analyzed the overall arrangement as if the taxpayers had simply given additional promissory notes to the savings association to cover the interest
obligations, and pointed out that the delivery of a note promising payment of cash in the future does not represent current payment for tax
purposes under the Supreme Court's decision in Don E. Williams Co. v.
Commissioner.19 The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the exchange of checks resulted in payment, describing the exchange of checks
as a "superficial payment structure [designed] solely to reap the benefits
of § 163(a)." 0
The court distinguished the line of Tax Court cases beginning with
Burgess v. Commissioner," which have permitted interest deductions
when payment was made with funds subsequently borrowed from the initial lender, on the ground that in this case the funds advanced for the
interest payments were never commingled with the taxpayer's other
funds and were not subject to the taxpayer's unrestricted control. Moreover, the court stated that the Burgess line of decisions "is of doubtful
validity" and would not be followed even if they were not factually distinguishable.2 ' In his dissenting opinion, Judge Politz stated that the court's
rejection of Burgess was not justified because the source of funds used to
make interest payments should not control the issue of deductibility
under section 163(a). He also emphasized that the taxpayers had sufficient funds in other bank accounts to cover their interest payments, and
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

611 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.), affd en banc, 631 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980).
429 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1977).
611 F.2d at 1035.
8 T.C. 47 (1947).
611 F.2d at 1036.

19811

FEDERAL TAXATION

1063

argued that the requirements of the Burgess decision were in fact met.
On rehearing en banc, Judge Johnson again wrote for the majority. In
his second opinion, he carefully sidestepped the issue of whether Burgess
was good law and based the holding on the fact that the loans had no
purpose other than to finance the interest obligations of the taxpayers.
Judge Politz, who was joined by nine other judges in dissent, reiterated
his views on the validity and applicability of the Burgess test in the case.
The case of Tandy Corp. v. United States" concerned the deductibility
of accrued interest and redemption premium upon the conversion of the
taxpayer's debentures into its stock pursuant to conversion rights granted
to the holders of the debentures. The convertible debentures in question
gave the taxpayer corporation the right to call them for redemption by
paying the principal amount, accrued interest, and a redemption premium in cash. When the corporation called the debentures for redemption, however, the vast majority of the holders elected to convert their
debentures into common stock because the "spread" between the market
price and the conversion price for the stock which could be purchased
upon conversion of each debenture was approximately double the accrued
interest and redemption premium.
The court denied the taxpayer's claimed deductions on the ground that
the taxpayer's obligation to pay the accrued interest and redemption premium was extinguished rather than paid when the debentures were converted into the corporation's common stock. The court based its decision
in large part on the fact that the bond indenture failed to give the debenture holders any credit upon the conversion for either the accrued interest or redemption premium. The court also held that the doctrine of constructive receipt did not authorize the taxpayer to treat the accrued
interest and redemption premium as if it had been paid.
In Kocurek v. United States," the court held that a "capital gain dividend" distribution from a regulated investment company (more commonly known as a "mutual fund") under section 852(b)(3)(C) is not
treated as an ordinary dividend for purposes of determining the limitation on a taxpayer's deductions for investment interest under section
163(d). The court reached its decision with some difficulty because the
applicable statutory provisions provided no clear guidance, but it nevertheless concluded that Congress intended to treat the distributions in
question like other items of capital gain income rather than as ordinary
dividends.2 The court drew support for its decision from various sections
23. 626 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1980).
24. 628 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980).
25. For the taxable years in issue and under present law, ordinary dividend income increases the amount of investment interest that can be deducted under the limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 163(d). On the other hand, capital gain income was treated less favorably

1064

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

of the Internal Revenue Code that differentiate between such capital gain
dividends and ordinary dividends. In particular, it pointed to section
854(a), which specifically provides that capital gain dividends (as defined
in section 852(b)(3)) do not qualify for the exclusion for dividends received by individuals under section 116 or the deduction for dividends
received by corporate taxpayers under section 243. The court regarded
this provision as indicative of the legislative intent that capital gain dividends are to be differentiated from ordinary income dividends, although
the taxpayers, not surprisingly, drew the opposite inference from Congress' failure to make specific reference to section 163(d) in section
854(a). The court thus filled in an inadvertent gap in the statutory language to reach what it perceived as the correct policy result.
In Pevsner v. Commissioner,' the court rescued the Service from an
adverse Tax Court decision with potentially sweeping impact. The case
dealt with the question of the deductibility of expenditures by the taxpayer, the manager of an Yves St. Laurent boutique, for the expense of
buying Yves St. Laurent clothing she was required to wear at work. The
Tax Court found that the taxpayer did not wear the designer clothing
away from work because it was not in keeping with her simple everyday
life style and because she wanted to make it last longer. The Tax Court
allowed the claimed deduction in view of these facts. Reversing this decision, the court of appeals first noted the generally accepted rule that an
employee may deduct the cost of clothing as a business expense under
section 162 only if it is specifically required as a condition of employment
and is not suitable for general wear. The court rejected the subjective test
used by the Tax Court for determining whether clothing is suitable for
general wear, agreeing with the Commissioner's argument that administrative necessity requires that this determination be made on the basis of
objective standards.
In Vinson v. Commissioner," the court held that the taxpayers could
deduct, as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162,
certain cultivation and maintenance expenditures incurred during the
preproductive years of their pecan orchards. The expenditures in question were for spraying, cultivating surrounding land, fertilizing, watering,
pruning, and irrigating the pecan trees. The court based its decision on
the provision in the treasury regulations" that gives farmers the option
either to deduct or to capitalize amounts expended in the development of
farms, orchards, and ranches prior to the time the productive state is
for this purpose during the years in issue and, under present law, does not increase at all the
amount of investment interest that can be deducted. See 628 F.2d at 907 n.1.
26. 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. 621 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1980).
28. Tress. Reg. § 1.162-12(a)(1972).
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reached. The Commissioner contended that because the expenditures in
this case preceded the budding of the pecan trees, they were capital expenditures preparatory to the completed acquisition of the orchard rather
than development expenditures within the meaning of the regulation.
The court rejected this contention, adopting the rule that maintenance
expenses incurred with respect to agricultural properties in the pre-productive state are deductible if they are similar to the expenses which will
be required to maintain such properties once they become productive.
The court in Vetrick v. Commissioner9 followed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Sharon v. Commissioner" and held that the taxpayer, a practicing attorney, could not deduct the cost of additional law school courses
and related travel expenses because the course of study qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or business. The taxpayer sought to avoid this rule
by emphasizing that he was already admitted to practice in the federal
courts and in the state courts of Montana at the time the courses were
taken. The court, however, pointed to the fact that the taxpayer incurred
the educational expenses in the course of acquiring a juris doctor degree,
which enabled him to sit for the bar of other states and made him eligible
for a position with the IRS as a tax examiner, and therefore concluded
that the purpose of the expenses was to qualify the taxpayer for a new
trade or business. The court also held that the Tax Court had properly
considered the ultimate consequences of the taxpayer's course of study in
subsequent taxable years to determine the nature of the educational expenses in the taxable year in controversy.
In Better Beverages, Inc. v. United States,3' the court faced the recurring issue of whether a portion of the purchase price for the assets of a
going business could be allocated to a covenant not to compete when the
purchase contract made no allocations to the particular assets that were
purchased. The purchaser on its books had allocated $244,000 of the total
$400,000 purchase price to the covenant and had attempted to amortize
the convenant over its ten-year life. On the other hand, the sellers had
made no allocation to the covenant and had reported all income realized
on their sale as gain from the sale of capital assets. The Internal Revenue
Service, in order to avoid being "whipsawed," took inconsistent positions
in auditing the buyer and sellers, denying the buyer's amortization deductions and treating $244,000 of the sales proceeds as ordinary income to
the sellers.
The court affirmed the district court's summary judgments against the
buyer and in favor of the sellers, not withstanding the evidence offered by
29.
30.
31.

628 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1980).
591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
619 F.2d 424, rehearing denied, 625 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the buyer concerning the value it attached to the covenant. The court
held that, in order for the buyer to satisfy his burden of proving a cost
basis in the noncompetition covenant for amortization purposes, it must
prove that the parties mutually intended at the time of the sale that some
portion of the lump sum consideration be allocated to the covenant. Since
the purchaser had offered no such evidence, the court held that summary
judgment was proper.
GeneralPortlandCement Co. v. United States8" was a lengthy, complicated opinion of enormous importance to cement producers but of little
interest to those who are not involved in that industry. The case concerned the computation of the percentage depletion deduction allowed by
section 613 for mineral deposits used by integrated mining and manufacturing companies in producing cement. The primary issues in this case
have been decided by the United States Supreme Court in Commissioner
v. PortlandCement Co.,8 reversing a decision by the Tenth Circuit which
the Fifth Circuit declined to follow in General Portland.
In Prince v. United States," a decedent's estate sued for the refund of
income taxes paid by the decedent during her lifetime on trust income
erroneously distributed to her. The decedent was the lifetime income
beneficiary of a trust established by her late husband. Following the decedent's death, the Alabama Supreme Court decided that her estate owed
over $170,000 to the trustee of the trust for the trustee's fees that should
have been deducted from trust income distributed to the decedent during
her lifetime. After the estate made the repayment to the trustee, it
claimed a federal income tax refund in the taxable year of the estate in
which the amounts were repaid based upon the special refund procedure
provided by section 1341. This section applies if an item was included in
gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) "because it appeared that
the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item."" Sections
1341(a)(5) and (b)(1) permit the refund, in the taxable year of the repayment, of taxes paid in a prior taxable year or years when recomputation
of the income tax liability for the prior year or years produces a greater
benefit than deducting the repayment in the taxable year it is made.
The government's position, which was accepted by the district court,
was that section 1341 did not apply in this case because the decedent had
an "actual" unrestricted right to the excess trust income distributed to
her and not just an "appearance" of such right. The government contended that the Alabama Supreme Court decision required the estate
only to make a "simple disbursement" and did not call into question the
32.
33.
34.
35.

628 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (Mar. 10, 1981).
101 S. Ct 1037 (1981).
610 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1980).
I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1980).
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decedent's entitlement to any of the trust income that she received. The
Fifth Circuit, however, flatly rejected this view as "incorrect," since the
Alabama judgment established that the deduction from trust income for
the trustee's fees had been miscalculated and the decedent had received
more income from the trust than she was entitled to receive. The court
therefore held that when the income had to be returned by the decedent's
estate, the requirements of section 1341 were clearly satisfied. The government did not argue, and the court did not consider, whether section
1341 might be inapplicable because the taxpayer claiming the benefit of
that section (the estate) was different from the taxpayer who had originally been taxed on the excess trust income (the decedent)."
II.

CORPORATE AND PARTNERSHIP ISSUES

The case of Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Director 7 illustrates the necessity of careful tax planning in corporate acquisitions. This case concerned the acquisition of the stock of six unrelated corporations (the Page
Corporations) by a first-tier subsidiary of Chrome Plate, Inc., for cash
and notes. Immediately following the transaction the stock of the Page
Corporations was transferred to a second-tier subsidiary in exchange for
all of the second-tier subsidiary's stock. The next day the six Page Corporations were liquidated into the second-tier subsidiary in tax-free liquidations under section 332. The second-tier subsidiary claimed a stepped-up
basis under section 334(b)(2) in the assets of the liquidated corporations
equal to the amount of cash and notes paid by the first-tier subsidiary for
their stock.
The court held that the second-tier subsidiary received a carryover basis in the assets of the liquidated corporations under section 334(b)(1)
rather than a stepped-up basis under section 334(b)(2) because it did not
acquire the stock of the liquidated corporations by "purchase" within the
meaning of section 334(b)(3). This result was mandated by section
334(b)(3)(B), which states specifically that the "purchase" requirement of
section 334(b)(2) is met only if the stock-of the liquidated corporation is
not acquired in an exchange to which section 351 applies. The taxpayer
conceded that the transfer of the stock of the acquired corporations to
the second-tier subsidiaries was a section 351 exchange but urged the
court to disregard it as superfluous to the overall transaction. The court
rejected this suggestion, stating that it could not ignore the form of the
36. See Rev. Rul. 77-322, 1977-2 C.B. 314, in which the Service conceded that an estate
could utilize I.R.C. § 1341 upon its restoration of an item previously included in the decedent's income under a claim of right. This ruling revoked Rev. Rul. 67-355, 1967-2 C.B. 296,

in which the Service had taken the contrary position.
37.

614 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1980).
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transaction deliberately chosen by the taxpayer.
The more significant aspect of the Chrome Plate decision was the
court's rejection of the taxpayer's alternative argument for a stepped-up
basis, which was based upon the doctrine of Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. v. Commissioner." The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine provided that
when a taxpayer, solely interested in acquiring a corporation's assets, purchased stock and then liquidated the acquired corporation, the transaction would be viewed as a purchase of assets and the various steps would
be considered a single transaction. In 1954, Congress added section
334(b)(2) to the Internal Revenue Code to incorporate rules effectuating
principles derived from Kimbell-Diamond, but failed to indicate whether
section 334(b)(2) was enacted to supersede the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine or merely to supplement it. The court summarized the discussions
in the commentary and the decided cases on the issue of whether the
Kimbell-Diamond rule survived the enactment of section 334(b)(2) and
stated, in no uncertain terms, its own view, that the Kimbell-Diamond
doctrine was abolished by the enactment of section 334(b)(2) for corporate taxpayers.8 9 Thus, the court made it clear that the only opportunity
for corporate taxpayers in the Fifth Circuit to step up the basis of assets
received in the complete liquidation of an acquired subsidiary is to comply fully with the requirements of section 334(b)(2).
TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States"0 involved the question of
whether a distribution to the taxpayer corporation from its 90%-owned
subsidiary immediately prior to the sale of the subsidiary's stock should
be treated as a dividend or as part of the consideration received from the
sale of the stock. The corporate taxpayer sought dividend treatment for
the distribution so that it would qualify for the 85% dividends received
deduction available to corporate taxpayers under section 243(a)(1). The
stock purchase agreement contemplated that the target corporation, an
insurance company, would declare a dividend in kind consisting of stocks
in certain over-the-counter companies that the purchaser did not want to
retain in the target corporation's investment portfolio. The purchase
price for the target's stock, which was determined by a formula, was then
reduced to take the dividend distribution into account. Immediately following the stock purchase, the purchaser made substantial contributions
of municipal bonds and cash to the capital of the acquired corporation to
replace the distributed assets.
The court held for the taxpayer, finding that the case was controlled by
38. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
827 (1951).
39. Contra, American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. C1.

1968).
40.

624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980).
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previous decisions of the Tax Court and Board of Tax Appeals " dealing
with similar presale dividend distributions of target corporation assets
that were not wanted by stock purchasers. The court distinguished its
prior decision in Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner' s as a case
concerning a sham arrangement. In that case a purported dividend paid
to the selling corporation prior to its sale of a subsidiary's stock was
treated as part of the sales price for the stock. The stock purchaser in
Waterman had originally offered to pay $3,500,000 for the target corporation's stock, but the selling corporation proposed a scheme whereby the
target distributed its $2,800,000 note to the seller as a purported tax-free
dividend (per the consolidated return regulations). The selling corporation then sold the target stock for $700,000 (its adjusted basis), and the
target immediately paid off its $2,800,000 note with funds supplied by the
purchaser. The government contended that the flow of assets out of and
into the target corporation in TSN Liquidating Corp. had the same effect
as the flow of funds in Waterman, but the court found that the structure
of the overall transaction had business substance that was totally lacking
in Waterman. The court also distinguished the case of Basic, Inc. v.
United States'8 on the ground that the distributed assets in TSN Liquidating Corp. were retained by the stockholders to whom they were distributed, rather than being immediately transferred to the purchaser as
they were in Basic.
General Housewares Corp. v. United States" involved the question of
the simultaneous applicability of the tax-free reorganization provision of
section 368(a)(1)(C) and the twelve month liquidation provision of section 337. In that case Olivier Company, Inc. (Olivier) adopted a plan of
complete liquidation, and three days later transferred its only asset (stock
in a third corporation) to U.S. Industries (USI) in exchange for shares of
USI voting stock. The government conceded that this exchange was taxfree to Olivier under section 361(a) because it was part of a valid "C"
reorganization pursuant to section 368(a)(1)(C). Olivier then sold approximately 25% of the USI shares received in the exchange (realizing a gain
of approximately $700,000), paid off its liabilities and distributed its remaining USI stock and cash to its shareholders in complete liquidation
within twelve months of the adoption of the liquidation plan. The issues
before the court were: (1) whether Olivier was entitled under section
337(a) to avoid recognition of the $700,000 gain it realized on its sale of
USI stock; (2) if section 337 did apply at the corporate level, whether the
41.
(1950);
42.
43.
44.

Gilmore v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1321 (1956); Coffey v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1410
Rosenbloom Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 763 (1931).
430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
549 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).

1070

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Olivier shareholders could avail themselves of the reorganization provisions to avoid recognition of the gain they realized in the liquidation; and
(3) in any event, whether the cash "boot" received by the Olivier shareholders in the liquidation was taxable as ordinary income under section
356(a)(2) or as capital gain.
In its appeal from the district court's decision in favor of the taxpayers,
the government's principal contention was that the taxpayer-favoring
provisions relating to complete corporate liquidations cannot apply when
the liquidation is part of a plan of reorganization. The government argued
that the continuity of proprietary interest required under the reorganization provisions is conceptually incompatible with a complete liquidation,
which generally requires the cessation of all business at the corporate
level and the distribution to the shareholders of all the corporation's assets remaining after payment of its debts. In other words, the government's basic position was that a liquidation-reorganization can be a "liquidation" or a "reorganization" but cannot be both.
The court found that there was no jurisprudential basis for accepting
the government's principal contention. It therefore applied the literal
terms of the statutory provisions involved and held that Olivier was entitled under section 337 to nonrecognition of the gain it realized on its sale
of USI stock. The court also held that the nonrecognition provision of
section 354(a) applied to the shareholder-level exchange of Olivier stock
for USI stock in the liquidation of Olivier, finding no inherent conflict
between that section and the liquidation provision of section 331(a)(1).
Concerning the taxation of the cash distribution to the Olivier shareholders in the liquidation, the court followed its previous decision in Shimberg v. United States," and held that the cash was taxable at ordinary
income rates under section 356(a)(2) because it had "the effect of the distribution of a dividend."
The court's decision in General Housewares allows target corporations
in the Fifth Circuit a good deal more flexibility in structuring "C" reorganizations when the acquiring company is unwilling to assume liabilities of
the target. The court was not presented with, and therefore did not address, the question of whether a corporation that receives "boot" in a "C"
reorganization and uses such boot to pay its liabilities before liquidating
could obtain nonrecognition treatment under section 337 notwithstanding
the contrary result indicated by section 361(b)(1)(B). Nevertheless, the
decision is contrary to the decision of the Court of Claims in FEC Liquidating Corp. v. United States,46 and the issue ultimately may have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.

45.
46.

577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978).
548 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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LX Cattle Co. v. United States47 was a personal holding company tax
case involving the taxpayer's right to deduct certain contested income tax
liabilities in determining its undistributed personal holding company income under section 545(b)(1), which provides a deduction for federal income taxes "accrued during the taxable year." The court held that Congress intended, by using the word "accrued" in section 545(b)(1), to
incorporate settled principles of tax accounting. Under the accrual
method of accounting, an expense is deductible only for the taxable year
in which all events have occurred which determine the fact of liability.
However, the special provision of section 461(f) permits a taxpayer to accrue a liability in the year of payment even though the taxpayer continues to contest the liability. Accordingly, the court concluded that the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct the contested income tax liability until
1971, the year in which it paid the contested liability. The court also held
that the taxpayer, in determining its personal holding company tax liability for 1969, could not deduct income taxes for the taxable years 1965
through 1967 that were actually paid in 1969, because the taxpayer had
previously been allowed a deduction for the additional income taxes in a
settlement agreement with the government relating to its taxable years
1965 through 1967. The court held that since the appellant had received
deductions in 1965, 1966, and 1967 for the additional income taxes paid
during 1969, it was not now entitled to the benefit of a second deduction
in 1969 for the same payments.
In Stafford v. United States,4 8 the government appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer. The
district court had held that the taxpayer had no taxable income upon his
receipt of a limited partnership interest since the partnership interest was
received by the taxpayer in a tax-free exchange for property under section 721(a). The taxpayer in Stafford had negotiated with Life Insurance
Company of Georgia (LOG) concerning the development of a hotel that
LOG wished to have built on property adjacent to its Atlanta corporate
headquarters. In 1967, LOG sent to the taxpayer a letter of intent regarding the proposal. The letter of intent was accepted by the taxpayer acting
as "General Partner of Partnership to be formed,"4 9 subject to further

negotiations regarding specific details of the arrangement. In 1969, a limited partnership was formed by the taxpayer and others, with the taxpayer as the sole general partner. The taxpayer purchased two units of
interest as a limited partner for $100,000 each and received an additional
unit of limited partnership interest purportedly as consideration for con47.
48.
49.

629 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980).
611 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 992.
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tributing to the partnership certain architects' drawings or renderings,
contractors' estimates, and the LOG letter of intent.
Following an income tax audit of the taxpayer for 1969, the Internal
Revenue Service assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer on the ground
that his additional unit of limited partnership interest was received as
compensation for services rendered and therefore was not subject to nonrecognition treatment under section 721. In reviewing the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the taxpayer in his refund action, the
court stated that the ultimate issue in the case was to determine what
consideration the taxpayer had given for his additional limited partnership interest. The court found conflicting evidence on this ultimate factual issue, based upon inconsistent statements in the affidavit and deposition of one of the taxpayer's witnesses. The court therefore reversed and
remanded the case to the district court. The court's opinion concluded
with a lengthy footnote discussing the applicable law under section 721."
In this footnote, the court stated its view that the enforceability of any
agreement evidenced by the letter of intent was important and material
to the issue at hand, rejecting the contrary position taken by the district
court. The court also pointed out that if the facts indicated that any ownership rights in the letter of intent inured directly to the limited partnership rather than to the taxpayer, summary judgment for the government
would be proper regardless of whether the letter of intent resulted in an
enforceable legal obligation.

III. ESTATE TAX
Estate of Bright v. United States" is an estate tax valuation case
which, if followed in future cases, may drastically increase the estate tax
liabilities of individuals who own interests in closely held businesses. The
decedent in this case had owned at her death a one-half community property interest in 55% of the stock of various closely held corporations. The
issue before the court was whether the district court had erred in ruling
that, as a matter of law, no control premium could be attributed to the
27.5% stock interests that were includable in the decedent's gross estate.
The court agreed with the estate that the estate tax is imposed only on
the value of the interest passing at death (i.e., the decedent's 27.5% interest), rather than the interest owned by the decedent or the interest to
which the transferees of the decedent succeeded. It further acknowledged
that value for this purpose is the price that a willing buyer would pay to a
willing seller. Nevertheless, the court departed from the traditional valua50. Id. at 995 n.6.
51. 619 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), motion for rehearinggranted, 628 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tion approach involving a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller
and held that the district court erred in failing to take into consideration
the fact that the shares being valued were part of a "control block." In so
doing, the court acknowledged that its decision was contrary to previous
decisions on the issue.5 ' The court thus vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether a willing seller would have broken up the control block of which
his shares were a part and sacrificed his share of the control premium or,
on the other hand, would only have sold his 27.5 % interest as part of a
control block."
By focusing on the fact that the 27.5% interest in question was part of
a "control block," the Bright,case apparently opens the way for the government to contend in any case dealing with valuation of a closely held
business interest that the decedent's interest was part of a similar "control block." By attaching relevance to the interests held by other persons
with whom the decedent (or, presumably, his successors in interest) might
have a community of interest, the decision clearly abandons the traditional valuation approach, mandated by long-standing regulations" and
well established case law, s5 which assesses value based upon a hypothetical sale between a hypothetical willing buyer and a hypothetical willing
seller. The decision is clearly not limited to interests held as community
property by husband and wife, but would have application in any situation in which the shares subject to estate or gift tax valuation were transferred by a member of a harmonious group. The case represents a significant victory for the Service and may provide support for the Service's
recent efforts to value closely held business interests at their "inherent"
value rather than their fair market value for estate and gift tax purposes.5" At this writing, the case is awaiting a rehearing en banc.57
In First Victoria National Bank v. United States,5 8 the court held that
"rice acreage history" interests under the system of rice allotments estab-

52. Id. at 410. The court acknowledges that Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. 860 (1978), and Sundquist v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R. 2d 74-6337 (E.D. Wash. 1974), support the estate's and
the district court's position.
53. Id. at 412.
54. Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that fair
market value is an objective determination, not the subjective determination of an executor
to whom all "relevant facts" may not be known).
56. See Tech. Advice Memo. 8010017 (Dec. 6, 1979) (denying minority interest discount
on intrafamily gift of stock, based largely upon supposed legislative intent in unifying estate
and gift taxes in Tax Reform Act of 1976).
57. See 628 F.2d 307.
58. 620 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1074

[Vol. 32

lished by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193859 constituted "property" includable in a decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The decision was based on the fact that the rice acreage history
was a valuable property right that was transferable by the decedent to his
heirs. The court emphasized, however, that the valuation of the rice acreage history must reflect the uncertainties surrounding the continuation of
the rice allotment program and other factors as they existed on the estate
tax valuation date.
In Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner," the court considered three separate cases involving the issue of whether the unavoidable operation of
Texas community property law causes property given by one spouse to
the other in Texas to be included in the gross estate of the donor spouse
under section 2036(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service had based its argument for estate tax inclusion upon the fact that, although the transferred property became the donee spouse's separate property, the income
produced by the property constituted community property of the spouses
under Texas law.
The court held that section 2036(a)(1) does not sweep the transferred
property back into the donor's gross estate in these circumstances. After
reviewing Texas community property law, the court concluded that the
donor's community property interest in the income produced by the
transferred property was so limited, contingent and expectant that it did
not amount to a "right to the income" of the property within section
2036(a)(1) as interpreted in United States v. Byrum.61 The court further
concluded that, because the donor spouse's interest in the income of the
property arises only by operation of mandatory provisions of Texas law, it
is neither "retained" nor does it arise "under" the transfers within the
meaning of section 2036(a)(1). The court also made it clear that its decision was influenced by the government's failure to press the issue during
the thirty-year period of time since the Fifth Circuit decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds," in which the court indicated its view that the
predecessor of section 2036(a)(1) was inapplicable in this context.
The court decided together two separate cases, Estate of Gilchrist v.
Commissioner and Estate of Reid v. Commissioner," dealing with the
question of whether a decedent's legal incompetence at the time of death
prevented the inclusion of property in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes under sections 2041(a)(2) or 2036(a)(2). In Gilchrist, the first of the two cases, the will of the decedent's husband had
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

7 U.S.C.
610 F.2d
408 U.S.
180 F.2d
630 F.2d

§§ 1351-56 (1976).
1282 (5th Cir. 1980).
125 (1972).
930 (5th Cir. 1950).
340 (5th Cir. 1980).
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granted the decedent an unrestricted power to consume the property
comprising the residue of his estate. The Tax Court, reasoning that the
decedent's legal incompetence prevented this power from being "exercisable" within the meaning of section 2041(b)(1) at the time of her death,
had held that the property subject to the power was not includable in the
decedent's gross estate." Nevertheless, after reviewing the legislative history and the relevant cases, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a
decendent's actual inability to exercise a general power of appointment is
irrelevant to the application of section 2041. The court then considered
the significance of the formal adjudication of the decedent as an incompetent, noting that the Tax Court had based its decision in favor of the
decedent's estate on the fact that the restrictions imposed on the decedent's guardians under Texas law had transmuted her general power into
one limited by "ascertainable standards." The court rejected this analysis
on the ground that ascertainable standards can prevent the application of
section 2041 only if they are imposed by the terms of the instrument creating the power. Because the decedent's power in this case continued in
effect by its terms despite the decedent's incompetence and was capable
of being exercised by her guardians at the time of her death, the court
concluded that the property subject to the power was properly includable
in the decedent's gross estate under section 2041.
The Tax Court in Reid, following its Gilchrist decision, had concluded
that the decedent's legal incompetence at the time of her death prevented
her from having any retained right to designate the persons who would
possess or enjoy property she had transferred to a trust.65 The Tax Court
therefore rejected the Commissioner's attempt to draw the trust property
back into the decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(2). The decedent, as settlor of a "spray" trust for her descendants, had reserved the
right in the trust instrument to appoint a new trustee in the event a trustee resigned. The trust instrument did not specifically bar the decedent
from appointing herself as trustee in the event of a resignation. In January, 1972, the decedent was declared incompetent by a Texas court; in
November of that year, she died.
The Tax Court based its decision in Reid on the fact that decedent's
incompetence effectively barred her and her guardians from naming
themselves as trustees in the event of a trustee's resignation. The Tax
Court therefore did not reach the issue of whether the decedent had actually reserved the right under Texas law to appoint herself as a successor
trustee. The Fifth Circuit found, however, that there was no Texas statute or case which would have barred the decedent's guardians from exer64.
65.

69 T.C. 5, 19 (1977).
71 T.C. 816, 822-23 (1979).
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cising any power of self-appointment that the decedent may have had.
The court therefore concluded that any such power reserved by the decedent continued to exist for estate tax purposes, and it remanded the case
to the Tax Court for determination of whether the decedent had, in fact,
reserved the power under state law to appoint herself as trustee.
IV.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Johnson v. Commissioner" dealt with the question of whether the Internal Revenue Service had properly mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to the taxpayer's last known address. The taxpayer, while under a
criminal and civil tax investigation, had given a power of attorney on IRS
Form 2848 to the Service, indicating that his address was that of his business office and that copies of all correspondence from the Service should
be sent to his attorneys. The taxpayer thereafter changed his business
address, although the IRS agents investigating his case were aware of that
fact by virtue of having visited the taxpayer at his new office. When the
Service prepared the taxpayer's statutory notice of deficiency, the taxpayer's power of attorney was inexplicably missing from the administrative file. The Service therefore sent the notice of deficiency by certified
mail, correctly addressed to the taxpayer's residence (the address shown
on the tax returns he had filed for the years in issue). The United States
Post Office attempted to deliver the certified letter twice; but, according
to the findings of the Tax Court, neither the taxpayer nor his wife, nor
anyone else at the residence, knew about the two attempted deliveries.
After the expiration of the ninety-day statutory period following issuance
of the notice of deficiency, the Service assessed the deficiencies and
mailed statements to the taxpayer indicating the additional taxes, penalties and interest asserted to be due. The taxpayer thereafter filed a petition in the Tax Court within ninety days following the receipt of the taxdue statement, and the Commissioner moved to dismiss the taxpayer's
petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Tax Court granted the Commissioner's motion, holding that the Commissioner had complied with the
requirement of section 6212 that the statutory notice be sent to the taxpayer's last known address.
The court held that the Tax Court's finding that the Commissioner had
complied with the requirements of section 6212 was clearly erroneous
based upon the Service's negligent mishandling of the power of attorney.
The court also acknowledged that its decision was influenced by the inequity of the taxpayer's predicament, particularly in view of the fact that
the Service had failed to follow the procedures established in the Internal
66.

611 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Revenue Service Manual for sending multiple notices of deficiency in
cases of this sort. The court emphasized, however, that its holding was
limited to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and was not
meant to require the Commissioner to adopt any new procedures for
sending statutory notices of deficiency.
The issue in Ford v. United States67 concerned the time at which taxes
are deemed "paid" for purposes of section 6511(a). This section requires
taxpayers to file refund claims within three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever
period expires later. The Internal Revenue Service had sent the taxpayers
in this case a statutory notice of deficiency on April 3, 1974, alleging that
they owed additional income taxes for 1970 and 1971. In response to this
notice, the taxpayers remitted payment of the additional taxes to the Service on June 6, 1974; but the Service did not formally assess the deficiencies until August 19, 1974. The taxpayers filed claims for refund on their
additional tax payments on August 9, 1976-more than two years after
they actually remitted payment of the additional taxes but less than two
years after the additional taxes were formally assessed by the Service.
When the taxpayers filed suit based on their refund claims, the government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the taxpayers' refund claims were not filed within two years after the taxes were
paid within the meaning of section 6511(a).
Affirming the district court's decision in favor of the taxpayers on this
issue, the court explained that its holding was mandated by the previous
Fifth Circuit decision in Thomas v. Mercantile National Bank." . That
case had held that taxes are paid in these circumstances for statute of
limitations purposes on the date of formal assessment, despite the taxpayer's earlier remittance of the funds. Nevertheless, the court in Ford
made clear its own view that the absolute rule of Mercantile National
Bank was not necessarily correct, noting that the great weight of authority outside the Fifth Circuit indicates that the taxpayers' intent in remitting funds to the government is an important factor in determining
whether the remittance constitutes a "payment" of tax. The court argued
that Mercantile National Bank adopts an unrealistic per se rule which
contradicts the basic concept that our taxing system is one of self-assessment. The court acknowledged, however, that it was required to follow
Mercantile National Bank until that case is overruled by the full court
sitting en banc.
The government in Ford argued that the intent of the taxpayer at the
time of remittance should be irrelevant to the issue of whether a remit-

67.
68.

618 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1980).
204 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1953).
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tance constitutes tax payment. Apparently, the government favored an
absolute rule based upon the date of remittance rather than the date of
formal assessment. The court, however, responded that there is even less
support for the government's position than for the hard and fast rule of
Mercantile National Bank.6" Nevertheless, sound principles of tax administration would appear to support an absolute rule based upon objective criteria on this procedural question under section 6511(a), whether
the rule is based upon the date of the taxpayer's remittance or the date of
the Service's formal assessment. It is therefore difficult to understand
why the court in Ford was anxious to abandon the longstanding, workable
rule of Mercantile NationalBank in favor of a subjective test that would
open the door to litigation over the taxpayer's intent in remitting funds
to the government in cases of this type.
The case of Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States,7 which involved an installment reporting issue discussed above,7 1 also involved two
separate statute of limitations questions arising under section 6511(a). As
noted above, section 6511(a) provides that a claim for refund of a tax
overpayment must be filed by the taxpayer "within 3 years from the time
the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever
of such periods expires the later." 7' In auditing the taxpayer's federal income tax returns for the years 1959 (the year in which the taxpayer made
his purported installment sale) through 1965, the Internal Revenue Service had asserted deficiencies for the years 1959, 1961, 1963, 1964 and
1965 and had agreed that the taxpayer had made overpayments of income
taxes in the years 1960 and 1962. The Service thus credited the 1960 and
1962 overpayments against the deficiencies asserted for the other years.
The taxpayer paid the net amount of the deficiencies in March, 1972.
When he filed his refund claims in August of 1973, the taxpayer sought to
recover refunds for the 1960 and 1962 overpayments, despite the fact that
the Service had granted him credit for those overpayments by reducing
the deficiencies for the other years involved. The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to recover a refund for 1960 or 1962 under section
6511(a) because no taxes had been "paid" for those two years within the
two-year period preceding the filing of the refund claims.
On the second statute of limitations issue, the court held that the deficiency payments made by the taxpayer in 1972 must be broken down into
separate payments for each taxable year involved, based upon the longaccepted principle that income taxes are computed on an annual basis.
The court therefore held that the taxpayer could obtain a refund for each
69.
70.
71.
72.

618 F.2d at 360 n.3.
613 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1980).
See notes 5-7 supra, and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 6511(a).
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year only to the extent that additional taxes were paid for that year
within the two-year period preceding the filing of the refund claims, rejecting the taxpayer's argument that he should be permitted, in effect, to
reallocate the additional tax payments he made in 1972 among the taxable years in controversy so as to avoid the limitations of section 6511(a).
The court also rejected the taxpayer's alternative claims for relief based
upon "equitable grounds" and the mitigation provisions of sections 1311
through 1315. The court noted that any action under the mitigation provisions must be brought by the taxpayer in a separate action at the conclusion of his appeal.
The court decided a number of cases involving claims by taxpayers for
attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976.73 The first of these cases was Prince v. United States7 4 an income
tax refund suit. The court rejected the taxpayer's claim in Prince because
the taxpayer had initiated the refund suit and there was thus no "proceeding. . . by or on behalf of the United States of America" as required
by the Act. 5 The court held that the fact that the refund suit could be
traced to administrative proceedings brought by the Internal Revenue
Service was not sufficient to permit the taxpayer to obtain the benefit of
the Act, notwithstanding statements to the contrary by Senator James
Allen of Alabama (who had offered the floor amendment to extend the
Act to actions under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code) several
months after the Act was signed into law.7 The court in Prince also rejected the taxpayer's alternative argument that a right
to attorney's fees
77
should be implied under the doctrine of Cort v. Ash.
8
The taxpayer in Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner"
appealed the Tax
Court's denial of its motion for allowance of attorney's fees under the Act
after the Tax Court's decision in favor of the taxpayer. Following its decision in Prince,the court held that neither the IRS audit nor the statutory
notice of deficiency which had precipitated the taxpayer's petition in the
Tax Court was a "proceeding" by or on behalf of the federal government
that would permit an award of attorney's fees under the Act. A third case
that followed Prince and Key Buick in a different factual context was
Alfonso v. United Statess7 9 which denied an award of attorney's fees
sought by a taxpayer who was successful in having a district court abate

73.
74.
34-36
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
610 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1980). The substantive issue in this case is discussed at notes
supra, and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
610 F.2d at 352 n.7.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
613 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980).
613 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).
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an attempted IRS jeopardy assessment.
On the other hand, the taxpayer in Jones v. United States 0 was successful in claiming attorney's fees under the Act. In that case, the Internal Revenue Service on audit had determined that a certain individual
was an employee rather than an independent subcontractor of Jones and,
therefore, had assessed federal unemployment taxes of $53.74 against
Jones. Jones paid the assessment, immediately filed a refund claim, and
thereafter filed suit based upon his refund claim. In the refund suit, the
government asserted a counterclaim against Jones for social security and
withholding taxes, despite the fact that it was clearly barred from collecting such taxes because of payments previously made by the alleged employee. After Jones was awarded his refund and the government's'counterclaim was rejected by the district court, Jones' motion for an award of
attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
was denied. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court reversed the district
court's denial of an award of attorney's fees, holding that when the
government filed its counterclaim the taxpayer became a defendant eligible to seek attorney's fees under the Act. The court went on to hold that
the taxpayer was entitled as a matter of law to an award of attorney's fees
in view of the frivolous and unreasonable nature of the government's
counterclaim against him.
The Internal Revenue Service's right to revoke a favorable letter ruling
retroactively was at issue in Lansons, Inc. v. Commissioner." The taxpayer in that case claimed income tax deductions for contributions to a
profit-sharing plan in 1969 through 1971, arguing that the Commissioner
abused his discretion under section 7805(b) and the applicable regulations 82 in revoking retroactively an earlier letter ruling that the plan was
qualified under section 401(a). The Service had originally approved the
plan in 1969, but sought retroactively to revoke its prior ruling in December, 1972, because the rapid turnover of the taxpayer's lower paid employees resulted in discrimination in favor of the prohibited group of officers, shareholders, and supervisory employees. The Service argued that
its original letter ruling could be revoked because it was issued on the
basis of a misstatement of material fact; but the court sustained the Tax
Court's decision that there was no material misstatement when the taxpayer mistakenly informed the Service in connection with its ruling request that the plan would initially cover ten rather than nine of taxpayer's twenty-four total employees. The court also found that the facts
supplied to the Service in connection with the original ruling request
80.
81.
82.

613 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1980).
622 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980).
Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(5).
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clearly showed the nature of the taxpayer's business, so that the facts
that developed subsequently were not materially different from the facts
on which the ruling was based. The court concluded that the variation in
the coverage percentages for the prohibited group was reasonably foreseeable from the facts initially supplied by the taxpayer and did not constitute a basis for retroactive revocation of the prior favorable determination. In view of its holding that the Commissioner could not retroactively
revoke the prior letter ruling, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether the Tax Court was correct in its alternative holding. That holding provided that since an eligibility requirement whose purpose and effect is to avoid immediate coverage of impermanent employees cannot be
discriminatory within the meaning of section 401(a)(3), the plan did not
discriminate in favor of the prohibited group.
The court decided numerous cases during 1980 involving the procedural rules applicable to civil and criminal investigations conducted by the
Internal Revenue Service. In Einhorn v. DeWitt,"' the taxpayer sought
injunctive and mandamus relief to force the Service to disclose requested
additional information in a criminal tax investigation. The taxpayers
based their suit on the regulations that establish the procedure for preindictment conferences with a taxpayer who may be the subject of a criminal investigation and provide that the IRS representative at the conference will inform the taxpayer concerning the general nature and basis of
the proposed criminal charges against him.8 4 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to
hear claims arising under the regulation because the regulation gives to
the IRS representative at the preindictment conference the complete discretion to decide whether requested information should be disclosed. In a
second case involving the same issue, Continental Electric Co. v. Kurtz6 5
the court reversed the district court's preliminary injunction requiring the
Service to disclose requested information at a preindictment conference,
citing its decision in Einhorn. The court also decided a spate of cases in
which taxpayers were seeking to prevent the enforcement of IRS summonses.8 6 These cases generally involved factual determinations concern83. 618 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1980).
84. Treas. Reg. § 601.107(b)(2) (1936).
85. 618 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1980).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Hankins, 631 F.2d 360 (5th Cir.), superceding, 624 F.2d
649 (5th Cir. 1980) (civil and criminal contempt judgments against taxpayer's attorney for
failure to answer IRS questions reversed on basis of attorney-client privilege); United States
v. Jones, 630 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 628 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank (of Atlanta), 628 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
First State Bank (of Clute), 626 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bank of
Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.
1980).
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ing the validity of the procedures used by the IRS agents in the cases
and, therefore, are not discussed herein.
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

In Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States,87 the issue was whether
meals and lodging provided by the taxpayer to its employees during their
tours of duty on the taxpayer's off-shore oil and gas drilling rigs were
"wages" subject to social security (FICA) and federal unemployment
(FUTA) taxes. Since 1940, the applicable regulations" had clearly provided that such meals and lodging constituted "wages" for those purposes. The court upheld the regulations and affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the government, finding that the "convenience of the employer" doctrine of the federal income tax law that prevented the meals and lodging from constituting wages for income tax
withholding purposes had no application under the employment tax statutes. The court's decision on this issue is contrary to decisions of the
Court of Claims, the Fourth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit.8
In Austin v. United States," the court held that the due process clause
was not violated by the application of a 1971 amendment 1l to section
58(g)(2), which resulted in an assessment of minimum tax against the
taxpayer in connection with the liquidation of a Liberian corporation.
The court held that the 1971 amendment constituted a clarification of the
preexisting statute, and it therefore did not deal with the taxpayer's argument that there was a retroactive application violative of due process.
The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that it was a denial of
equal protection to require her to pay the minimum tax while not requiring all of the other ten taxpayers involved in the transaction to pay the
same tax.
United States v. Smith9 was an appeal by a tax protester from his
criminal conviction for willful failure to file tax returns and willful supplying of false or fraudulent information on withholding exemption certificates. The court held that the defendant's filing of Forms 1040 containing zeros on every line did not constitute the filing of a tax "return"
87. 624 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 917 (1981).
88. Treas. Reg. 106, § 402.227 (1940) (current version at Tress. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-l(f)
(1957)); Tress. Reg. 107, § 403.227 (1940) (current version at Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(b)-1(f)
(1957)).
89. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1980); Royster Co. v.
United States, 479 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1973); Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United States, 597
F.2d 1348 (Ct. C1. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
90. 611 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1980).
91. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 308, 85 Stat. 524 (1971).
92. 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1980).
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under section 7203. The court also held that the district court was correct
in charging the jury that it is not a defense to the charges involved that
the defendant acted for the purpose of protesting government policies,
even if he did so in good faith.

